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Abstract
Verified artificial intelligence (AI) is the goal of designing AI-based systems that are provably correct
with respect to mathematically-specified requirements. This paper considers Verified AI from a formal
methods perspective. We describe five challenges for achieving Verified AI, and five corresponding
principles for addressing these challenges.
1 Introduction
Artificial intelligence (AI) is a term used for computational systems that attempt to mimic aspects of human
intelligence (e.g., see [17]). Russell and Norvig [56] describe AI as the study of general principles of
rational agents and components for constructing these agents. More broadly, the field of AI involves building
intelligent entities that mimic ‘cognitive’ functions we intuitively associate with human minds, such as
‘learning’ and ‘problem solving.’ We interpret the term AI broadly to include closely-related areas such
as machine learning [43]. Systems that heavily use AI, henceforth referred to as AI-based systems, have
had a significant impact in society in domains that include healthcare, transportation, social networking, e-
commerce, education, etc. This growing societal-scale impact has brought with it a set of risks and concerns
including errors in AI software, cyber-attacks, and safety of AI-based systems [55, 20, 3]. Therefore, the
question of verification and validation of AI-based systems has begun to demand the attention of the research
community. We define “Verified AI” as the goal of designing AI-based systems that have strong, ideally
provable, assurances of correctness with respect to mathematically-specified requirements. How can we
achieve this goal?
A natural starting point is to consider formal methods — a field of computer science and engineering
concerned with the rigorous mathematical specification, design, and verification of systems [72, 16]. At
its core, formal methods is about proof: formulating specifications that form proof obligations, designing
systems to meet those obligations, and verifying, via algorithmic proof search, that the systems indeed meet
their specifications. Verification techniques such as model checking [14, 53, 15] and theorem proving (see,
e.g. [49, 34, 30]) are used routinely in the computer-aided design of integrated circuits and have been widely
applied to find bugs in software, analyze embedded systems, and find security vulnerabilities. At the heart of
these advances are computational proof engines such as Boolean satisfiability (SAT) solvers [41], Boolean
reasoning and manipulation routines based on Binary Decision Diagrams (BDDs) [8], and satisfiability
modulo theories (SMT) solvers [5].
In this paper, we consider the challenge of Verified AI from a formal methods perspective. That is, we
review the manner in which formal methods have traditionally been applied, analyze the challenges this
approach may face for AI-based systems, and propose techniques to overcome these challenges. To begin
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with, consider the typical formal verification process as shown in Figure 1, which begins with the following
three inputs:
1. A model of the system to be verified, S;
2. A model of the environment, E, and
3. The property to be verified, Φ.
The verifier generates as output a YES/NO answer, indicating whether or not S satisfies the propertyΦ in en-
vironment E. Typically, a NO output is accompanied by a counterexample, also called an error trace, which
is an execution of the system that indicates how Φ is violated. Some formal verification tools also include
a proof or certificate of correctness with a YES answer. In this paper, we use the term “formal verification”
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Figure 1: Formal verification procedure.
to apply to any verification technique that uses some aspect of formal methods. For instance, we include
simulation-based hardware verification methods that, while based on formal specifications (assertions), em-
ploy best-effort heuristics to find violations of those specifications. (The term “semi-formal verification” is
sometimes used for such methods.) Such simulation-based verification methods have also found practical
use in industrial verification of cyber-physical systems, e.g., for automotive systems [33, 25, 73].
In order to apply formal verification to AI-based systems, at a minimum, one must be able to generate
the three inputs S, E and Φ in formalisms for which (ideally) there exist decision procedures to answer the
YES/NO question as described above. Additionally, these decision procedures must be efficient. Meeting
these requirements, however, is not straightforward. Indeed, in our view, the challenges for Verified AI stem
directly from these requirements. We outline these challenges in Section 2 below, and describe ideas to
address each of these challenges in Section 3.1
2 Challenges for Verified AI
We identify five major challenges to achieving formally-verified AI-based systems. In this section, we sketch
out these challenges, illustrating them with examples from the domain of (semi-)autonomous driving.
2.1 Environment Modeling
In the traditional success stories for formal verification, such as verifying cache coherence protocols or de-
vice drivers, the interface between the system S and its environment E is well defined. Moreover, while the
environment itself may not be known, it is usually acceptable to model it as a non-deterministic process sub-
ject to constraints specified in a suitable logic or automata-based formalism. Typically such an environment
model is “over-approximate”, meaning that it may include more environment behaviors than are possible.
1The first version of this paper was published in July 2016 in response to the call for white papers for the CMU Exploratory
Workshop on Safety and Control for AI held in June 2016. This is the second version reflecting the evolution of the authors’
understanding of the challenges for Verified AI, along with selected new results.
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We see systems based on AI or machine learning (ML) as being quite different. Consider an autonomous
vehicle operating in rush-hour traffic in an urban environment. It may be impossible even to precisely define
all the variables (features) of the environment that must be modeled, let alone to model all possible behaviors
of the environment. Even if these variables are known, non-deterministic or over-approximate modeling is
likely to produce too many spurious bug reports, rendering the verification process useless in practice.
Similarly, for systems involving joint human-machine control, such as semi-autonomous vehicles, hu-
man agents are a key part of the environment and/or system. Researchers have attempted modeling humans
as non-deterministic or stochastic processes with the goal of verifying the correctness of the overall sys-
tem [54, 57]. However, such approaches must deal with the variability and uncertainty in human behavior.
One could take a data-driven approach based on machine learning, but such an approach is sensitive to the
quality of data. For example, the technique of inverse reinforcement learning [46] can be used for learning
the reward function of human agents [1, 74]. However, accuracy of the learned reward function depends on
the expressivity of the hand-coded features by the designer and the amount and quality of the data collected.
In order to achieve Verified AI for such human-in-the-loop systems, we need to address the limitations of
the current human modeling techniques and provide guarantees about their prediction accuracy and conver-
gence. When learned models are used, one must represent any uncertainty in the learned parameters as a
first-class entity in the model, and take that into account in verification and control.
The first challenge, then, is to come up with a method of environment modeling that allows one to
provide provable guarantees on the system’s behavior even when there is considerable uncertainty about the
environment.
2.2 Formal Specification
Formal verification critically relies on having a formal specification – a precise, mathematical statement
of what the system is supposed to do. However, the challenge of coming up with a high-quality formal
specification is well known, even in application domains in which formal verification has found considerable
success (see, e.g., [6]).
This challenge is only exacerbated in AI-based systems. Consider a module in an autonomous vehicles
that performs object recognition, distinguishing humans from other objects. What is the specification for
such a module? How might it differ from the specifications used in traditional applications of formal meth-
ods? What should the specification language be, and what tools can one use to construct a specification?
Thus, the second challenge is to find an effective method to specify desired and undesired properties of
systems that use AI- or ML-based components.
2.3 Modeling Systems that Learn
In most traditional applications of formal verification, the system S is precisely known: it is a C program, or
a circuit described in a hardware description language. The system modeling problem is primarily concerned
with reducing the size of the S to a more tractable representation by abstracting away irrelevant details.
AI-based systems lead to a very different challenge for system modeling. A major challenge is the use
of machine learning, where the system evolves as it encounters new data and new situations. Modeling a
deep neural network that has been trained on millions of data points, has non-linear components, stochastic
behavior, and thousands of parameters can be challenging enough even if one “freezes” the training process.
New abstraction techniques will be necessary. Additionally, verification must account for future changes
in the learner as new data arrives, or else be performed incrementally, online as the learning-based system
changes. In short, we must devise new techniques to formally model components based on machine learning.
3
2.4 Computational Engines for Training, Testing, and Verification
The effectiveness of formal methods in the domains of hardware and software has been driven by advances
in underlying “computational engines” — e.g., SAT, SMT, simulation, and model checking. Such computa-
tional engines are needed for intelligent and scalable training, testing, and verification of AI-based systems.
However, several challenges must be overcome to achieve this.
Training and Testing: Formal methods has proved effective for the systematic generation of test data in
various settings including simulation-based verification of circuits (e.g., [35]) and finding security exploits
in commodity software (e.g., [4]). In these cases, even though the end result is not a proof of correctness of
the system S, the generated tests raise the level of assurance in the system’s correctness.
AI-based systems benefit from testing not just by gaining a higher level of assurance, but also by lever-
aging the generated data for retraining. Moreover, recent efforts have shown that various machine learning
algorithms can fail under small adversarial perturbations (e.g., [47, 26, 45, 29, 50]). Learning algorithms
promise to generalize from data, but such simple perturbations that fool the algorithms create concerns re-
garding their use in safety-critical applications such as autonomous driving. Such small perturbations might
be even unrecognizable to humans, but drive the algorithm to misclassify the perturbed data. Further, we
need to generate not just single data items, but an ensemble that is “realistic” and satisfies distributional
constraints.
Thus, the question is: can we devise techniques based on formal methods to systematically generate
training and testing data for ML-based components?
Quantitative Verification: Several safety-critical applications of AI-based systems are in robotics and cyber-
physical systems. In such systems, the scalability challenge for verification can be very high. In addition to
the scale of systems as measured by traditional metrics (dimension of state space, number of components,
etc.), the types of components can be much more complex. For instance, in (semi-)autonomous driving,
autonomous vehicles and their controllers need to be modeled as hybrid systems combining both discrete
and continuous dynamics. Moreover, agents in the environment (humans, other vehicles) may need to be
modeled as probabilistic processes. Finally, the requirements may involve not only traditional Boolean
specifications on safety and liveness, but also quantitative requirements on system robustness and perfor-
mance. Yet, most of the existing verification methods are targeted towards answering Boolean verification
questions. To address this gap, new scalable engines for quantitative verification must be developed.
2.5 Correct-by-Construction Intelligent Systems
In an ideal world, verification should be integrated with the design process so that the system is “correct-
by-construction.” Such an approach could either interleave verification steps with compilation/synthesis
steps, such as in the register-transfer-level (RTL) design flow common in integrated circuits, or modify the
synthesis algorithms themselves so as to ensure that the implementation satisfies the specification, such as
in reactive synthesis from temporal logic [51]. Can we devise a suitable correct-by-construction design flow
for AI-based systems?
One challenge is to design machine learning components that satisfy desired properties (assuming we
solve the formal specification challenge described above in Sec. 2.2). For this, we need techniques that can
synthesize a suitable training set, and update it as needed. We should synthesize the structure of the learning
model, and potentially also a good set of features. Finally, we should have a principled approach to training
that leverages the specification and environment models.
Another challenge is to design the overall system comprising both learning and non-learning compo-
nents. While theories of compositional design have been developed for digital circuits and embedded sys-
tems (e.g. [61, 69]), we do not as yet have such theories for AI-based systems. Moreover, there is not yet
a systematic understanding of what can be achieved at design time, how the design process can contribute
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to safe and correct operation of the intelligent system at run time, and how the design-time and run-time
techniques can interoperate effectively.
3 Principles for Verified AI
For each of the challenges described in the preceding section, we suggest a corresponding set of principles
to follow in the design/verification process to address that challenge. These five principles are:
1. Introspect on the system and actively gather data to model the environment;
2. Formally specify end-to-end behavior of the AI-based system, and develop new quantitative formalisms
to specify learning components;
3. Develop abstractions for and explanations from ML components;
4. Create a new class of randomized and quantitative formal methods for data generation, testing, and
verification, and
5. Develop techniques for formal inductive synthesis of AI-based systems, supported by an integrated
design methodology combining design-time and run-time verification.
We believe these techniques are just a starting point. Our formal methods perspective on the problem
complements other perspectives that have been expressed (e.g., [3]). Taken together with other ideas, we
believe that the principles we suggest can point a way towards the goal of Verified AI.
3.1 Introspective Environment Modeling
Recall from Sec. 2.1 the challenge of modeling the environment E of an AI-based system S. We believe that a
promising strategy to meet this challenge is to develop design and verification methods that are introspective,
i.e., they identify assumptions A that system S makes about the environment E that are sufficient to guarantee
the satisfaction of the specification Φ. The assumptions A must be such that, at run time, S can efficiently
monitor A so as to ensure that they always hold. Moreover, if there is a human operator involved, one might
want A to be translatable into an explanation that is human understandable, so that S can “explain” to the
human why it may not be able to satisfy the specification Φ.
Ideally, the assumptions A must be the weakest set of such assumptions that S makes about its environ-
ment. However, given the other requirements for A to be efficiently monitorable and human understandable,
one may need to settle for a stronger assumption.
As an example, consider an autonomous vehicle that is trying to maintain a minimum distance from
any other object while being in motion — this forms the specification Φ. Note that Φ defines an interface,
including a set of sensors that the vehicle S must use to check for itself that Φ is satisfied. On top of
this interface, suppose that S tracks other features of the environment E such as the state of traffic lights,
the number of vehicles in its vicinity, their state such as their velocity, whether they are human-driven, an
estimate of those human drivers’ intent and driving style, etc. It will then need to generate assumptions A to
monitor over this expanded interface (as well as its internal state) so as to ensure that when A is satsified, so
is Φ.
Extracting good assumptions may be easier during the design process, e.g., while synthesizing a con-
troller for S. Preliminary work by the authors has shown that such extraction of monitorable assumptions is
feasible in simple cases [37, 39, 28], although more research is required to make this practical.
In addition, we need to actively gather data about real and simulated environments and use those to learn
and update our environment models. Put another way, we must monitor and interact with the environment,
both offline and online, in order to model it. Initial work by the authors [57, 60, 59] has shown how data
gathered from driving simulators via human subject experiments can be used to generate models of human
driver behavior that are useful for verification and control of autonomous vehicles.
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3.2 End-to-End Specifications, Quantitative Specifications, and Specification Mining
Writing formal specifications for AI/ML components is hard, perhaps even impossible if the task involves a
version of the Turing test. How can we address this challenge described in Sec. 2.2?
As researchers often say: when the problem is too hard, perhaps we should change the problem! We
believe that formally specifying the behavior of an AI/ML component may be unnecessary. Instead, one
should focus on precisely specifying the end-to-end behavior of the entire AI-based system. By “end-to-
end” we mean the specification on the entire system or at least a precisely-specifiable sub-system containing
the AI/ML component, not on the AI/ML component alone. Such a specification is also referred to as a
“system-level” specification. We believe that this latter task, in many if not most cases, can be done more
easily.
Consider again our autonomous vehicle scenario from the previous section. It should be straightforward
to specify the property Φ corresponding to maintaining a minimum distance from any object during motion.
This property says nothing about any component that uses machine learning.
Of course, in order to test the ML-based component, it is useful to have a formal specification on its
interface. However, we believe this specification does not need to be exact: a “likely specification” could
suffice. We suggest the use of techniques for inferring specifications from behaviors and other artifacts —
so-called specification mining techiques (e.g., [24, 36, 33]), for this purpose.
In addition, we should address the mismatch between how design objectives are expressed in formal
methods (typically using Boolean specifications given in logic or as automata) and how these are expressed
in machine learning (typically as cost or reward functions). One approach to bridge this gap is to move
to quantitative specification languages, such as logics with quantitative semantics (e.g. [40]) or notions of
weighted automata (e.g. [11]).
3.3 Formal Abstractions and Explanations for Machine Learning
Let us now consider the challenge, described in Sec. 2.3, of modeling systems S that learn from experience.
We believe a combination of automated abstraction and explanation-based learning will be needed to model
such systems for purposes of formal verification.
First, effective techniques need to be developed to abstract ML components into a formalism for which
efficient verification techniques exist or can be developed. Since the guarantees many ML algorithms give
are probabilistic, this will require the development of probabilistic logics and similar formalisms that can
capture these guarantees (e.g., [58]). Additionally, if the output of a learning algorithm is accompanied by
a measure of uncertainty about its correctness, then that uncertainty must be propagated to the rest of the
system and represented in the model of the overall system. For example, the formalism of convex Markov
decision processes (convex MDPs) [48, 52, 57] provide a way of representing uncertainty in the values of
learned transition probabilities. Algorithms for verification and control may then need to be extended to
handle these new abstractions (see, e.g., [52]).
The task of modeling a learning system can be made easier if the learner accompanies its predictions
with explanations of how those predictions result from the data and background knowledge. In fact, this
idea is not new – it has long been investigated by the ML community under terms such as explanation-
based generalization [44]. Recently, there has been a renewal of interest in using logic to explain the
output of learning systems (e.g. [71]). Such approaches to generating explanations that are compatible with
the modeling languages used in formal methods can make the task of system modeling for verification
considerably easier.
The literature in formal methods on explaining failures or counterexamples may also be relevant. For
example, assume that a misclassification by a ML component causes a failure of an end-to-end specification.
If we can apply techniques from the formal methods literature to localize that failure (e.g., [38, 36]), then
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we could identify whether the ML-component was responsible. Counterfactual reasoning has been used in
the formal methods literature for explaining failures, and we believe such an approach will also be useful in
the context of AI-based systems.
3.4 Randomized and Quantitative Formal Methods for Training, Testing, and Verification
Consider the challenge, described in Sec. 2.4, of devising computational engines for scalable training, test-
ing, and verification of AI-based systems. We see three promising directions to tackle this challenge.
Randomized Formal Methods: Consider the problem of systematically generating training data for a ML
component in an AI-based system. More concretely, suppose we wish to systematically test a classifier
f : Rn→ R that given a set of data points (images, audio, etc.) x ∈ Rn assigns a real-valued label to them
f (x) ∈ R. One testing problem is to find a perturbation r ∈ Rn such that the algorithm flips the label it
assigns to (many) examples upon perturbation, i.e., f (x) 6= f (x+ r).
Such perturbations cannot be done arbitrarily. One challenge is to define the space of “legal” pertur-
bations so that the resulting examples are still legal inputs that look “realistic”. Additionally, one might
need to impose constraints on the distribution of the generated examples in order to obtain guarantees about
convergence of the learning algorithm to the true concept. How do we meet all these requirements?
We believe that the answer may lie in a new class of randomized formal methods – randomized algo-
rithms for generating test inputs subject to formal constraints and distribution requirements. Specifically, a
recently defined class of techniques, termed control improvisation [27], holds promise. An improviser is a
generator of random strings (examples) x that satisfy three constraints: (i) a hard constraint that defines the
space of legal x; (ii) a soft constraint defining how the generated x must be similar to real-world examples,
and (iii) a randomness requirement defining a constraint on the output distribution. The theory of control
improvisation is still in its infancy, and we are just starting to understand the computational complexity and
to devise efficient algorithms. Improvisation, in turn, relies on recent progress on computational problems
such as constrained random sampling and model counting (e.g., [42, 9, 10]). Much more remains to be done.
Quantitative Verification: Recall the challenge to develop techniques for verification of quantitative re-
quirements – where the output of the verifier is not just YES/NO but a numeric value. We believe such
techniques can be useful not only in verifying quantitative requirements but also in generating relevant
training and test data for ML components.
The complexity and heterogeneity of AI-based systems means that, in general, even formal verification
of Boolean specifications is likely to be undecidable. (For example, even deciding whether a state of a linear
hybrid system is reachable is undecidable.) To overcome this obstacle posed by computational complexity,
one must either (i) find tractable but realistic problem classes, or (ii) settle for incomplete or unsound formal
verification methods (i.e., semi decision procedures). Techniques for simulation-based verification (also
termed as falsification or run-time verification) can prove very fruitful in this regard, as has been recently
demonstrated for industrial automotive systems (e.g. [21, 25, 19, 73]). A key element of these techniques is
the formulation of verification as optimization, i.e., a quantitative approach.
Such falsification techniques can also be used for the systematic, adversarial generation of training data
for ML components. Recent work has shown how a falsifier can be combined with a systematic generator of
adversarial inputs for a deep neural network so as to find violations of a system-level specification [22, 23].
Similarly, work on SMT solving must be extended to more effectively handle cost constraints — in other
words, combining SMT solving with optimization methods (e.g., [67, 68, 7]).
Safe Exploration for Learning: There has been considerable recent work on safe learning-based control
(e.g., [12, 13, 2]). In this approach, a safety envelope is pre-computed and a learning algorithm is used to
tune a controller within that envelope. Techniques for efficiently computing such safety envelopes based,
for example, on reachability analysis [70], are needed. Reachable sets will need to be encoded in a rep-
resentation suitable for efficient use during exploration. Additionally, how does one generate “interesting”
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trajectories within the safety envelope to train the learning system well? We believe the theory of control
improvisation [27] could be useful here.
3.5 Formal Inductive Synthesis and Integrating Design Time with Run Time
Developing a correct-by-construction design methodology for AI-based systems, with associated tools, is
perhaps the toughest challenge of all. For this to be fully solved, the preceding four challenges must be
successfully addressed. However, we do not need to wait until we solve those problems in order to start
working on this one. Indeed, a methodology to “design for verification” may well ease the task on the other
four challenges.
First consider the problem of synthesizing learning components correct by construction. The emerging
theory of formal inductive synthesis [31, 32] addresses this problem. Formal inductive synthesis is the
synthesis from examples of programs that satisfy formal specifications. In machine learning terms, it is the
synthesis of models/classifiers that additionally satisfy a formal specification. The most common approach
to solving a formal inductive synthesis problem is to use an oracle-guided approach. In oracle-guided
synthesis, a learner is paired with an oracle who answers queries. The set of query-response types is defined
by an oracle interface. In many cases, the oracle is a falsifier that can generate counterexamples showing
how the learned component violates its specification. This approach, also known as counterexample-guided
inductive synthesis, has proved effective in many scenarios. In general, oracle-guided inductive synthesis
techniques show much promise for the synthesis of learned components by blending expert human insight,
inductive learning, and deductive reasoning [63, 64].
However, due to the undecidability of verification in most instances and the challenge of environment
modeling, we believe it will be difficult, if not impossible, to synthesize correct-by-construction AI-based
systems in many scenarios. Autonomous driving is one such application domain. In such cases, we believe
design-time verification must be combined with run-time verification and recovery techniques. For exam-
ple, the Simplex technique [66] provides one approach to combining a complex, but error-prone module
with a safe, formally-verified backup module. Recent techniques for combining design-time and run-time
assurance methods (e.g., [62, 18]) can be leveraged to design a robust system.
4 Conclusion
Taking a formal methods perspective, we have analyzed the challenge of formally verifying systems that
use artificial intelligence or machine learning. We identified five main challenges: environment modeling,
formal specification, system modeling, computational engines, and correct-by-construction design. For
each of these five challenges, we have identified corresponding principles for design and verification that
hold promise for addressing that challenge. We are currently engaged in developing the theory behind these
principles, and applying them to the design of human cyber-physical systems [65] and learning-based cyber-
physical systems, with a special focus on autonomous and semi-autonomous vehicles. We expect to report
on the results in the years to come.
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